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Hugh Lacey’s Model to Analyze the Relationship between Values and Scientific Endeavor

by Richard Meckien - published Mar 24, 2014 03:10 PM - - last modified May 10, 2016 09:16 AM
Rights: Carlos Malferrari (translator)

Hugh LaceyAuthor of an extensive corpus on the critique of science, philosopher Hugh Lacey, a professor emeritus at Swarthmore College, rejects both positivist objectivism, which denies the influence of values in scientific activities, and postmodern relativism, which denies distinction between cognitive values and ethical and social values. Advocating an intermediate viewpoint between the two extremes, he developed a model for the interaction between values and scientific practices that was widely canvassed during his first sojourn (2013) as a visiting professor at the IEA, when he worked with the Philosophy, History & Sociology of Science and Technology Research Group, in which he is a participant.

Lacey’s model is unique because it includes, in the same analytical framework, epistemological issues and concrete implications of science in contemporary society. In his studies, Lacey questions the idea that domination over nature is an intrinsic ethical value of scientific practice and argues that scientific institutions – and the scientists themselves – must take into account social, ecological and human contexts when choosing the strategy of their research. “Scientific work has been treated more like a business and scientists are subject to pressures of productivity that often leave them with no time to reflect on and discuss their responsibilities as scientists,” he stressed.

In the following interview to journalist Flávia Dourado, Lacey explains some of the assumptions of his model, criticizes the growing subordination of science to economic interests, and calls attention to the importance of developing alternatives to today’s hegemonic currents by investing, for instance, in studies on agroecology as a way of highlighting the risks involved in transgenesis. According to him, “contemporary scientific institutions are dominated by the notion that science aims to generate technoscientific innovations that contribute to economic growth and, more generally, to technological and economic progress.”

1) The model of interaction between science and values that you propose assumes a distinction between epistemic/cognitive values and social and ethical values. What characterizes each of these value groups in their relationship with the scientific endeavor?

In the model, several logically (not temporally) distinct moments (or stages) of scientific activities have been identified, including: M1 – adoption of a research strategy; M2 – undertaking the research; M3 – cognitive evaluation of theories and hypotheses; M4 – dissemination of scientific results; an M5 – application of scientific knowledge. The epistemic/cognitive values concern the criteria for the cognitive evaluation of theories and hypotheses (i.e., evaluation of them as bearers of knowledge and understanding of phenomena) at M3. They include, among others, the empirical adequacy, explanatory power and consistency of theories and hypotheses.[i] Social and ethical values may have various (proper, as well as sometimes improper) roles at the other moments. These values concern, respectively, ideals of a good (or desirable) society (e.g., progress, social justice) and of acceptable and obligatory human behavior and relations (e.g., honesty, autonomy, solidarity).[ii] The distinction between cognitive and the other kinds of values underlies the ideal of impartiality (or objectivity), that (at M3) judgments about scientific knowledge should be based only on the cognitive values, and that they neither presuppose not imply any commitments concerning social and ethical values.[iii]

2) Is it the distinction between these two value groups ​​that allows us to make an ethical and political critique of science without necessarily questioning scientific objectivity?

Yes. Political/ethical values may play roles at all the moments, except M3, without impartiality being impaired. E.g., at M1, social values may have an integral role in the adoption of strategies for research, where strategies involve (1) constraints on the kinds of theories and hypotheses that will be considered in a research program, and (2) criteria for the selection of empirical data to procure and record – of what phenomena, in what (often experimental) conditions – for the sake of gaining knowledge of selected phenomena, or aspects of them, and identifying the possibilities open to them.[iv] The constraints limit the kinds of phenomena (and possibilities open to them) of which we gain knowledge in a research project, and so social values may play a role in determining what phenomena are investigated. However, the knowledge we gain of them should be established at M3, in the light only of the empirical data, and whether or not the knowledge claims (theories, hypotheses) being evaluated manifest the cognitive values highly in relation to these data. The impartiality of this knowledge, therefore, is not impaired. Remember, however, that it is knowledge of the selected kinds of phenomena; and gaining knowledge of them (rather than of other kinds of phenomena) may serve especially well interests informed by certain social/ethical/political values. So, one may make political/ethical criticism of the adoption of these strategies rather than other ones, without challenging the impartiality of the knowledge gained and without implying that this knowledge (qua knowledge) should be challenged on political/ethical grounds. The political/ethical criticism would lead to engaging also in research that is conducted under other strategies that would enable knowledge of phenomena (of interest in light of the political/ethical values in play) to be gained.

This point is of great significance in my discussions of the controversies connected with using transgenics.[v] [Throughout this interview, I will frequently make use of the case of transgenics and its competitors, e.g., agroecology.] The knowledge that has informed developments and innovations of transgenics (gained under strategies deployed in molecular biology and biotechnology) accords with impartiality; but it tells us little about the environmental and social risks that are occasioned by using transgenics, or about the alternatives (e.g., agroecology) that might be used in agricultural practices. Political/social/economic considerations lie behind emphasizing almost exclusively the research conducted under the strategies of molecular biology and biotechnology, and downplaying research on the other phenomena just referred to. Likewise, different political/social/economic considerations lie behind questioning the relative inattention given to research conducted under strategies that could inform issues of risks and alternatives. Either way, political/ethical values influence judgments made at M1, but (in principle, for all parties) this leave impartiality unchallenged at M3.

3) Does a criticism focused on ethical and social values include scrutinizing the submission of scientific activity to economic values, particularly to the ideals of development and progress?

Yes. Contemporary scientific institutions are dominated by the notion that science aims to generate technoscientific innovations that contribute to economic growth and, more generally, to technological and economic progress. This has several problematic consequences. They include:

a) The criteria for evaluating scientific contributions, and the productivity of individual scientists, have become intertwined with (in some cases subordinated to) economic considerations. E.g., gaining patents to discoveries has become an indicator of scientific success. The intertwining of scientific and economic considerations can create conflicts of interest (e.g., downplaying evidence of potential risks of using a new drug, in order not to endanger its profitable use; and keeping empirical data pertaining to risks secret).

b) Scientific work has become treated more like work within a business, and scientists have become subjected to productivist pressures that often leave them with little time for reflection and discussion about their responsibilities as scientists. Marcos Barbosa de Oliveira, co-director (with Pablo Mariconda) of the Theme Project Genesis and Meaning of Technoscience: On the Relationships between Science, Technology and Society, in which I am a participant and which is located in IEA, has written important articles on these consequences.

4) Has science prioritized values linked to private interests, to capital, to the detriment of those associated with public interests and social welfare?

Following up my response to the previous question, the notion that underlies “private-interest science” – that science aims to generate technoscientific innovations that contribute to economic growth and, more generally, to technological and economic progress – entrenches the almost exclusive role given in scientific institutions to research strategies (like those of molecular biology [see response to question 2]) that constrain the theories investigated to those that can represent the underlying law and structure of phenomena in a way that dissociates them from their ecological, human and social contexts. I now call them decontextualizing strategies.[vi] It is a consequence of adopting decontextualizing strategies almost exclusively that environmental and social effects of introducing innovations (such as those connected with climate change) tend not to be well investigated in advance of their introduction.

I have argued that private-interest science, not only conflicts with the ideal of the modern scientific tradition that scientific knowledge belongs to the common patrimony of humanity, but also weakens democratic institutions.[vii] In several recent writings,[viii] I have proposed that this approach to scientific research should be balanced by strong support (including appropriate levels of funding) for research that is framed by the following question:

“How should scientific research be conducted, and by whom, with what priorities and using what kinds of strategies, and how should technologies be developed and administered, so as to ensure that nature is respected, that its regenerative powers are not further undermined and restored wherever possible, and that the rights, well being and conditions for constructive participation in a democratic society, are enhanced for everyone everywhere?”

Obviously, asking this question is motivated by ethical/social values, by interest in public interests that are not subordinated to commercial ones. However [see answer to question 2]), this does not imply that impartial knowledge of phenomena (e.g., linked with environmental risks, and approaches to practical activities like agriculture that are not based on technoscientific innovations) cannot be obtained in research conducted under the strategies adopted – just as aiming to foster economic growth and progress (also social values) is consistent with gaining impartial knowledge of phenomena and their underlying laws and structures.

5) How do you see the tensions between the public and the private that underlie contemporary scientific controversies, such as those related to climate change, transgenesis and nuclear power?

I find it difficult to address these three cases together; so, in order to give a sharper answer, I’ll just focus on the transgenics case. I have argued in several writings that public interests can be well served (and the question [posed in the response to question 3] answered in concrete terms) only if agricultural innovations and policies are responses that arise in research that addresses the question of “the space of agricultural alternatives”:[ix] “Which agricultural methods – ‘conventional,’ transgenic, organic, agroecological, biodynamic, subsistence, indigenous, permaculture and others, including those adapted to urban environments –, in which combinations and with which place-specific variations might be sustainable (even in the current situation of global warming and climate change), relatively free from harm and from the risk of doing harm, and productive enough, when accompanied by viable distribution methods (taking into account the largest population concentration in urban environments), to meet the food and nutrition needs of the world’s population for the foreseeable future?”

Transgenics were introduced, not after receiving confirmation from research, which dealt with the space of alternatives, that transgenics were indeed needed for meeting the world’s food needs. Instead, the research and development of the transgenics that are currently being used responded more to the question: “Using the methods of genetic engineering, what traits can crop plants be modified to have; and which ones might be able to be commercially exploited?” Having recognized the potential of using transgenics for commercial (private interests, agribusiness corporations went ahead with developing and implementing varieties of transgenics with the traits that they deemed desirable (e.g., resistance to herbicides that the corporations themselves produced). Putting resources into investigating the question of the space of alternatives would be contrary to their interests – for, antecedently to its being conducted, that research could not guarantee that a major role (or, indeed, any role at all) for transgenics would be supported.

6) Are the values of objectivity, neutrality and autonomy, so dear to scientific endeavor, being jeopardized because of the growing influence of the private sector in science through research funding?

In the seminars I gave at  the IEA in 2013, I stated the ideal of neutrality in this way:[x] “In principle, (1) each value perspective (viable and sustainable in today’s democratic societies) is embedded in practices that may be informed by some items of the established corpus of scientific knowledge (or that may use some applications of scientific knowledge), and (2) the body of scientific knowledge (as a whole) serves all value perspectives more or less equally, without favoring some over others.” Neutrality is undermined when scientific institutions become dependent on private sources for their funding (or public sources that prioritize research that is intended to contribute to economic growth). Then the outcomes of research are likely to serve especially well the interests of capital and the market often at the expense of those that may reflect values connected (e.g.) with social justice and environmental sustainability. Research, development and innovation of transgenics (e.g.) has served the interests of agribusiness very well, but transgenics have no place in (e.g.) agroecology, an approach to farming that responds to such values as social justice, maintaining the well-being of local communities and strengthening their cultural values, democratic participation and sustainability; and, where private interests have influence over scientific institutions, research that would be potentially relevant to agroecology (e.g., research pertaining to the space of alternatives) is thoroughly marginalized.

Where neutrality is weakened, so too is autonomy, where autonomy refers to the ideal that there be no interference from non-scientific interests (religious, political, economic) in setting the agendas and methodologies of scientific research.[xi] However, autonomy is difficult to characterize precisely, for scientific institutions depend on outside bodies for their funding, so that outside influences cannot be eliminated even in principle. The difficult issue is how to reconcile a role for outside influences but not to permit outside interference. “Private-interest science” has little interest in exploring such reconciliation.

Note that issues about neutrality are especially pertinent at M5, and those about autonomy at M1. Those involving impartiality (objectivity) are especially pertinent at both M3 and M5. At M5, questions about both the efficacy of an innovation and the legitimacy of using it need to be considered. Usually matters of efficacy are settled at M3; the knowledge that underlies the claim that an innovation works (and how it works) is expected to be confirmed in accordance with impartiality. Legitimacy, however, involves issues of benefits, harm caused, risks and possible alternatives. These are all matters with ethical implications, and usually none of them are adequately addressed in the scientific research that leads to impartial claims being made about efficacy. E.g., the efficacy of using certain transgenics in certain conditions is explained by reference to the theories of molecular biology and biotechnology that enabled the development of transgenics; but this research tells us nothing about the social and ecological conditions needed for, and effects of, using transgenics in actual agricultural practices. Private interest science is well served by insisting on the ideal of impartiality at M3 (although it does open up possibilities for conflicts of interests [see response to question 3); but by not providing support for research on the crucial issues about legitimacy, any claims made about, e.g., there being no serious risks that cannot be dealt with adequately in the light of enforced regulations, are likely to be discordant with impartiality.

7) According to the model you propose, social and ethical values operate mainly in the choice of a research strategy. The way this choice is made explains why science prefers research problems that are relevant from the standpoint of interests associated with economic growth and the policies that emphasize it, but less auspicious to the interests of popular movements, family farmers and, overall, marginalized people and groups?

In discussions of the model, I emphasize the role of social and ethical values (at M1) in choosing the strategies to be adopted in a research project. This is the most distinctive feature of the model. However, these values also have roles at the other moments (except at M3). The role they play at M5 is especially noteworthy, and it is closely connected with the role they play at M1: frequently strategies are adopted anticipating applications that would serve interests that embody specific values. In contemporary scientific institutions, research projects tend to be chosen that require the adoption of strategies [the ones I called decontextualizing strategies in my response to question 3] that have mutually reinforcing relations with the values of technological progress and those of capital and the market, the values desired to be especially well served by applications (innovations) that arise from the research. But these values conflict with those articulated in the popular movements (e.g., social justice, participatory democracy, sustainability), which are not well represented in scientific institutions, and so little support becomes available to engage in research under the strategies (strategies that do not involve decontextualization) that might produce results that would serve their interests.

The role that social and ethical values play in the adoption of research strategies makes it highly likely that the results of the research, on application, will serve especially well interests that embody these values, often at the expense of interests that embody competing values. This implies that neutrality cannot be approximated, unless scientific institutions become open to supporting a multiplicity and variety of research programs that can be responsive to the range of value held in a democratic society.[xii]

8) Among the values that influence scientific endeavor, do you include values linked to ambition for academic prestige, to the desire for power and to the political game that often pervades scientific activity?

Yes, values like these are often in play at M2, the moment of carrying out the research, and the influence can be quite positive when it provides motivation to engage with really difficult questions – the aspiration to gain the Nobel Prize is generally thought to be an appropriate one for scientists to have. These values can also have negative influence. For example, at M1 today, they may contribute to strengthening the idea of science as investigation aiming to produce technoscientific innovations that contribute to economic growth, and the unfortunate consequences connected with this [see response to question 6]; and, at M3, they may lead to personal interests over-riding judgments that should be supported by the evidence alone, and create conflicts of interest in various other ways. The so-called “scientific ethos” described by the sociologist Robert Merton is intended to counteract the negative effects of these values. I, myself, have not written much on this question.

9) You associate the Baconian principle of control over nature with the decontextualized approach to science, distinguished by a disregard for the ecological, social and human contexts that underlie the phenomena being studied. What values predominate in this approach?

Yes, I have argued that there are mutually reinforcing relations between adopting decontextualizing strategies and holding a value-outlook that contains what I now call the values of technological progress, In this value-outlook, the exercise of control over natural objects – or, in Bacon’s terminology, “the domination of nature” – becomes in itself a social value that is not generally or systematically subordinated to other social values, while high ethical value is attributed to innovations that increase human ability to control natural objects; to the evergrowing penetration of technologies into more and more domains of daily life,  human experience and social institutions; and to the definition of problems in terms that make for technoscientific solutions. Pablo Mariconda’s articles on this topic are very good. Furthermore, in present-day technoscience, holding the values of technological progress is reinforced by (and reinterpreted in the light of) the fact that today institutions that embody values of capital and the market (especially economic growth and the centrality of property) are the foremost bearers of these values.

10) Is it the prevalence of these values that hinders the advancement of research aimed at social inclusion and sustainability? What are the challenges to carry out alternative research programs that do not adopt the decontextualized approach to science?

The values of technological progress (especially when interpreted in the light of those of capital and the market) are in all sorts of ways in conflict with those of social justice, social inclusion, the well-being of everyone, and environmental sustainability. Where they predominate (and they predominate in most countries today) there is likely to be little public or private material, financial and other support for engaging in research conducted under strategies that have mutually reinforcing relations with the competing values. E. g., using my earlier example, there is little support for agroecology, or for the investigation of risks that have socioeconomic mechanisms that may be occasioned by introducing technoscientific innovations, or for research concerning programs of public health that integrally involve the participation (in both research and delivery of services) of local groups, or for research on the possible fruitful interaction between modern scientific studies and indigenous knowledge and methods of its acquisition, or in social technology – to mention just a few areas of significance. (Incidentally, I refer to the strategies needed for research in these areas as involving “alternative strategies.” By this, I intend to convey that it requires the use of strategies that are not reducible to decontextualizing ones; but it also makes use (where appropriate) of results obtained under decontextualizing strategies. The alternatives strategies could not replace decontextualizing ones for all research purposes. The model allows for pluralism of strategies; it does not challenge the central importance of decontextualizing strategies.)[xiii]

The great challenge is to gain more space for conducting research under the alternative strategies, and to continue to expand it. This involves many dimensions.

Philosophers of science (like myself) have an important role: to show (among other things) (1) that the virtual exclusivity of the decontextualizing strategies in contemporary natural scientific research is not soundly based in the ideals – impartiality, neutrality and autonomy – of the scientific tradition; (2) that, in fact, the predominance of these strategies is owed more to the mutually reinforcing relations between adopting them and holding the values of technological progress; and (3) that, when research as a whole is conducted under a plurality of strategies, the possibility of moving towards realization of the traditional ideals becomes apparent – more generally, to show that science does not have to be conducted in the way in which it is largely conducted in mainstream scientific institutions, and that there are good reasons (based in the ideals of the tradition) why these institutions should open up space to the alternatives.

But that is only a beginning step. The challenge requires drawing input from many parties, each one engaged in efforts in its own space and practices. The prospects for success will depend on achieving successes, initially small-scale ones, in many spaces and practices that, in turn, open up possibilities for expansion when put into dialectical interaction with the others. It requires the unfolding of a very complex dialectic, which would require – cooperatively, simultaneously and in interaction – expanding successful achievements connected with each of the following matters (and, no doubt, others):[xiv]

a) Taking advantage of the space that is available in institutions, like universities, that are not completely dominated by the values of capital and the market and that see themselves as having responsibilities to further democratic interests, and develop research projects that use some of the alternative strategies (e.g., in agroecology, public health and preventive medicine, alternative sources of energy, free computer software, etc).

b) Taking steps towards claiming and strengthening autonomy in research institutions: towards freeing them from the disproportionate influence of the values of capital and the market in setting the priorities of scientific research and determining appropriate methodologies, from the interference derived from holding these values in the conduct of science (e.g., via legal imposition of regimes of intellectual property rights), and from impositions that are being made on the character of scientific work and its regimes of operation [see response to question 3].

c) Aiming for more widespread adoption of the Precautionary Principle in research institutions,[xv] and its incorporation in public science policies, so that technoscientific innovation becomes more subordinated to the values expressed in it, and the kinds of research on risks and alternatives, which its use shows to be needed, become conducted more extensively.

d) Working for the growth of – and active collaboration among – movements that aspire to democratic values, including the protection of human rights, the full range of economic/social/cultural as well as civil/political rights recognized in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and to strengthening of the values of democratic participation, so that consciousness grows about the plurality of research strategies that are needed to provide knowledge that would enable all democratic projects to become informed by scientific knowledge.

e) Organizing for the growth of movements, institutions and programs in which researchers, practitioners and citizens collaborate, including programs for educating citizens to be able to be intelligent participants in deliberations on science policy matters, for scientists to learn from citizens what they consider to be the principal problems and interests that need to be addressed, and how they experience the problems and perceive the causal networks that bring them about and maintain them. There is needed the participation of scientists, industry and the public to work out how to re-institutional science, and to create examples showing how democratic and multicultural participation might enhance science.

11) In your research proposal to the IEA, you mention ethical, economic and social values that, on one hand, maintain scientific objectivity against postmodern arguments, but, on the other, reject characterizations of this objectivity derived from Positivism. What are the disputed postmodern arguments and characterizations with a Positivist tint, and what results from excluding both these extremes?

“Positivism” and “postmodernism” are widely used terms, but rarely are they used precisely or univocally. So I’ll just refer to aspects of these views, without attempting to characterize them completely.

Regarding positivism, I criticize the view, which we find in many of the intellectual descendants of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle of the 1930s, that (in my terms) there is no legitimate role for social/ethical values at either M1 or M3. This is the core of the widely held “positivist” claim that “science is value free.” In practice these positivists rarely made a distinction between these two moments, or (as I do) between adopting a strategy and accepting a theory; for them, what I diagnose as constraints on theories under decontextualizing strategies are built into their characterization of scientific theories. This had the consequence that the relationship between adopting decontextualizing strategies virtually exclusively and holding the values of technological progress remained effectively invisible.

The “postmodernist” view I criticize is highly sensitive to the role of the values of technological progress and their links with those of capital and the market in shaping contemporary science. It maintains that there is not a sharp distinction between cognitive and social/ethical values, and thus that social/ethical values can play legitimate roles at M3, and it has the consequence that even well made evaluations of scientific theories and hypotheses are essentially marked by relativism. It denies that a significant distinction between objectivity and subjectivity can be upheld. Sometimes, this has been taken to justify rejecting much of established science simply on the ground that it has strong links the values of capital and the market.

My position, which avoids the two extremes, recognizes a legitimate role for social/ethical values at M1, but not at M3. It upholds the distinction between cognitive and other kinds of values, but recognizes that social/ethical values do play many legitimate roles in the conduct of research, and shows how this need not lead to relativism or subjectivism. It enables there to be a social/political critique of actual scientific practices without thereby making the cognitive appraisal of scientific theories (as distinct, e.g., of their being objects for research and their results being applied) a matter for social/political critique.

12) Still according to your research proposal, the seminars you held at the IEA might help to expand the theses included in your model. Could you give an example of this expansion?

The model of the interaction of science and values allows the possibility of there being a range of fruitful strategies (not limited to the decontextualizing strategies) each of which bears mutually reinforcing relations with holding a particular value-outlook. The seminars aimed to show that this is not just a logical possibility, by discussing alternative strategies that have already proved their fruitfulness in promising, if currently limited, ways. I myself have examined the case of agroecology in considerable detail.[xvi] Its strategies bear mutually reinforcing relations to the value outlook of “social justice, democratic participation and ecological sustainability.”[xvii] The strategies enable the empirical/theoretical investigation of agroecosystems dealing simultaneously with their productivity, sustainability, capacity to maintain biodiversity, their contribution to health of the agricultural community, and how they affect local culture, agency and values, often with a view to generating what the community itself determines to be a suitable and viable balance of these dimensions. Proponents of transgenics, e.g., often dismiss agroecology as simply expressing an ideological desire.[xviii] The model represents that, although holding particular social/ethical values (that contest those of capital and market dominant in the mainstream) has close links with adopting agroecological strategies, this leaves untouched that judgments made at M3 in agroecological research may accord with impartiality [see the  response to question 2). The significance of the model depends on the fruitfulness of cases like agroecology (and many others) being demonstrated in actual practice.

13) What is the content of the dossier on science and values that you and professor Pablo Mariconda are organizing with contributions obtained in the seminars?

The dossier begins with an article, jointly written by Pablo and me, that contains what we consider a mature and standardized version of the model of the interaction of science and values. We hope this will be useful, for – although the model dates back to the mid 1999s[xix] – it has been refined and developed (and a lot of the terminology deployed has been changed) over the years in the course of numerous seminars organized by Scientiae Studia [philosophical association of scholars associated with the IEA research group that publishes the Scientiae Studia journal] here in São Paulo. The standardized version that we offer takes into account all these refinements and developments (and uses what has now become settled terminology), and points to places where further work is needed. In a second article, based in the model, I argue that how scientific research is to be understood today is open to two interpretations that I call “commercially-oriented technoscience” and “multi-strategy research.” This claim provides the structure for most of the dossier: several articles criticizing commercially-oriented technoscience, but in a way that recognizes the positive value of many technoscientific innovations; and others that aim to show the promise of multi-strategy research in the areas: social technology, agroecology, public health, and potential interaction between modern scientific research and traditional (indigenous) knowledge-gaining practices. (We hope that others will develop examples in many other areas of research, e.g., energy and communications.) Finally, in response to the fact that the model suggests limits to common conceptions of the rationality of science (that tend to be connected with positivism), there are a series of articles on the rationality of science, all in different ways attempting to explore how rationality marks scientific practices, but with different types of considerations coming to the fore at the different moments.


Lacey, Hugh (1998) Valores e Atividade Científica. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial and Fapesp. (First edition of VAC-1)

––––  (1999) Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding. London & New York: Routledge.

––––  (2006a) A Controvérsia sobre os Transgênicos: questões científicas e éticas. São Paulo: Editora Idéias e Letras.

––––  (2006b) “O Princípio de Precaução e a autonomia da ciência.” Scientiae Studia 4: 373–392.

––––  (2008) Valores e Atividade Científica 1. São Paulo: Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia/Editora 34 –VAC-1.

––––  (2008a) “Ciência, respeito à natureza e bem-estar humano.” Scientiae Studia 6: 297-327.

––––  (2008b) “Aspectos cognitivos e sociais das práticas científicas.” Scientiae Studia 6:83-96.

––––  (2008c) “Crescimento econômico, meio-ambiente e sustentabilidade social: a responsabilidade dos cientistas e a questão dos transgênicos.” In Gilberto Dupas (ed.), Meio-ambiente e Crescimento Econômico: Tensões estruturais, pp. 91-130. São Paulo: Editora Unesp.

––––  (2010) Valores e Atividade Científica 2. São Paulo: Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia/Editora 34. VAC-2

––––  (2011a) “A imparcialidade e as responsabilidades dos cientistas.” Scientiae Studia 9: 487-500.

––––  (2011b) “A interação da atividade científica, visões de mundo e perspectivas de valores,” in Eduardo R. Cruz (ed.), Teologia e Ciências Naturais: Teologia da criação, ciências naturais e tecnologia em diálogo, pp.127–147. São Paulo: Editora Paulinas.

––––  (2011c) Preface to Márcia M. Tait, Tecnociência e Cientistas: Cientificismo e Controvérsias na política de biossegurança brasileira, pp. 13-29. São Paulo: Editora Annablume.

––––  (2012a) “Pluralismo metodológico, incomensurabilidade, e o status científico do conhecimento tradicional.” Scientiae Studia 10 : 425–453.

––––  (2012b) “Las diversas culturas y la práctica de la ciencia.” In F. Tula Molina & G. Giuliano (eds.), Culturas Científicas y Alternativas Tecnológicas, pp. 133-169. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva.

––––  (2013) “Rehabilitating neutrality.” Philosophical Studies 162: 77-83.

Lacey, Hugh & Mariconda, Pablo (2013) “The Eagle and the Starlings: Galileo’s argument for the autonomy of science – how pertinent is it today?.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 43: 122–131.

Mariconda, P & Lacey, H. (2001) “A águia e os estorninhos: Galileu sobre a autonomia da ciência.” Tempo Social 13: 49-65.

[i] VAC-1, cap. 3.

[ii] VAC-1, cap. 2; VAC-2, cap. 11

[iii] VAC-1, cap. 1; VAC-2, cap.1; Lacey (2006a: introdução; 2008b; 2011a)

[iv] VAC-1, especialmente cap. 5; VAC-2, parte 1.

[v] Lacey (2006a; 2008c; 2011c); VAC-2, parte 2

[vi] VAC-2, parte 1; Lacey (2012a; 2012b)

[vii] Lacey (2008a; 2011b; 2012b).

[viii] E.g., Lacey (2008a).

[ix] Lacey (2006a; 2008a; 2008c; 2011c)

[x] My most detailed discussions of impartiality, neutrality and autonomy are in Lacey (1999: ch. 10; 2008a); VAC-2, cap.1. On neutrality, see also Lacey (2013).

[xi] On autonomy, see my collaborative articles with Pablo Mariconda (Mariconda & Lacey, 2001; Lacey & Mariconda (2012).

[xii] Lacey (2013).

[xiii] VAC-2, cap. 2; Lacey (2008a)

[xiv] Lacey (2008a; 2012b)

[xv] Lacey (2006b)

[xvi] Lacey (2006a); VAC-2, parte 2.

[xvii] Lacey (2008a; 2011b; 2012a)

[xviii] Lacey (2011c)

[xix] Lacey (1998; 1999).